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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, * 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 890554-CA 
v. : 
ROBERT M. BROWN, : Category No. 2 
DAVID E. ELKINS, & 
SUSAN B. ELKINS, : 
Defendants-Appellants. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from guilty pleas by each defendant to 
one count of possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
distribute, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (1990). This Court has jurisdiction to hear 
the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 
1989), as the appeal is from a district court in a criminal case 
not involving a conviction for a first degree felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. The standard of review to examine a trial court's 
determination of the sufficiency of an affidavit in support of a 
search warrant is whether the lower court was clearly in error. 
State v. Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54, 57 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
2. Whether the trial court correctly determined that 
the affidavit in support of the search warrant established 
probable cause for the search. 
3. Whether the Leon good faith exception is applicable 
to this case. 
4. Whether the trial court correctly determined that 
the affidavit in support of the search warrant did not contain 
false and misleading information. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of the provisions upon which the State 
relies is included in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendants David E. Elkins and Susan L. Elkins were 
originally charged with one count of production of a controlled 
substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8(1)(a)(i) (1990), and one count of unlawful possession 
of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1990) (Record contained in the 
court file of Robert M. Brown [hereinafter B.R.] at 15-16). 
Defendant Robert M. Brown was originally charged with unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann* § 58-37-
8(1)(a)(iv) (1990) (B.R. at 20). Counsel for all three 
defendants throughout these proceedings has been Herschel Bullen 
(B.R. at 55). 
Throughout the trial record, Susan Elkins' middle initial is 
given variously as ML" or "B". Since she signed her name as 
Susan L. Elkins on the Statement of Defendant, the State will use 
that initial in the body of this brief (Record contained in the 
court file of David E. Elkins and Susan B. Elkins [hereinafter 
E.R. at 54). 
On March 3, 1989, defendants filed a motion to suppress 
evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant (B.R. at 55). A 
hearing on that motion was conducted March 8, 1989, in the Third 
Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Frank 
G. Noel, district judge, presiding (E.R. at 13 and Transcript of 
hearing [hereinafter Tr.]). Before and after the hearing, 
counsel for the opposing parties filed memoranda and affidavits 
in support of their respective positions (B.R. at 87-114 and E.R. 
at 15-20 and 27-34). Based on the hearing and the documents, the 
trial court denied the motion to suppress and entered findings of 
fact, conclusions of law, and an order to that effect (E.R. at 
36-39; a copy of this material is attached as Addendum A). 
Subsequently, on May 22, 1989, the State filed amended 
informations against defendants, charging Brown with unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, 
or, in the alternative, unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance, each a third degree felony (B.R. at 118-19). The 
Elkins were charged with production of a controlled substance, 
or, in the alternative, unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance, each a third degree felony (E.R. at 24-25). Following 
remand and a waiver of preliminary hearing, the defendants each 
entered conditional guilty pleas to one count of possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute. (B.R. at 125-28; 
E.R. at 42; and transcript of change of plea hearing, July 28, 
1989). 
On September 5, 1989, Judge Noel sentenced each 
defendant to a term not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. The sentences were stayed and defendants placed on 
probation for two years with certain conditions (B.R. at 153-54 
and E.R. at 58-61). Notices of appeal were filed and 
certificates of probable cause were signed for each defendant on 
September 6, 1989 (B.R. at 155-57 and E.R. at 64-73). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On November 4, 1988, Robert Williams telephoned an 
organization called Crime Solvers and reported that marijuana was 
present at 1268 and 1276 Montgomery, Salt Lake City, Utah (Tr. at 
84). Crime Solvers contacted Metro Narcotics Task Force who then 
contacted Mr. Williams about his report (Tr. at 84 and 40-43). 
Detective David Jensen obtained information from Mr. Williams 
about the houses at the addresses given. Mr. Williams described 
the homes and the attached greenhouses, and told about marijuana 
being grown and sold from that area. He also told the detective 
about the relationship he had to the defendants, although this 
relationship was not explained in the affidavit (Tr. at 44). 
Detective Jensen, along with Detective Robert Caffery, 
went to the addresses to attempt to verify the information which 
they had been given (Tr. at 44 and 60). At the addresses given, 
the officers found a common driveway between the homes and found 
the attached greenhouses just as they had been advised (Tr. at 
45-46 and 60-62). The officers approached the backs of the 
houses along a canal bank which is a public right of way (Tr. at 
46 and 60). As they approached 1276 Montgomery, they both 
smelled a "pungent" aroma of marijuana (Tr. at 49 and 60). Both 
officers had had experience in drug enforcement and were able to 
identify the odor (Tr. at 50-52 and 60-62). 
As the officers looked at the greenhouses from the 
canal bank, they were able to see a plant pressed against the 
translucent panel material of one of the greenhouses (Tr. at 49 
and 63). To their trained eyes, the plant had the appearance of 
marijuana (Tr. at 49, 63 and 70). 
Based on this information, the officers went to the 
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office and received help in preparing 
a search warrant and affidavit (Tr. at 56 and 66, a copy of the 
search warrant and affidavit are attached as Addendum B). The 
officers had no reason to believe that the affidavit or search 
warrant were defective (Tr. at 57 and 66). Officer Caffery, who 
swore to and signed the affidavit, considered it to be truthful 
(Tr. at 66). 
The search warrant was executed and marijuana was found 
in both homes (B.R. at 144-49). The plant in the greenhouse, 
which the officers thought might have been marijuana, turned out 
to be a different kind of plant of similar appearance, but not 
marijuana (Tr. at 65-66 and 70). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Statements of citizen informants are to be accorded an 
assumption of reliability. That assumption, coupled with the 
corroborating evidence gathered by the officers and included in 
the affidavit, provided sufficient information to support a 
finding of probable cause for issuance of the search warrant in 
this case. 
Even if the information contained in the affidavit did 
not support a finding of probable cause, it was sufficient to 
support the officers' objective reliance on the warrant to search 
the houses of defendants. 
The trial court correctly determined that defendants 
had not proven that the officers knowingly or recklessly included 
any false statements in their affidavit. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVIT ESTABLISHED 
SUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE TO SUPPORT THE 
ISSUANCE OF THE SEARCH WARRANT. 
Defendants first claim that the affidavit was 
insufficient to support a finding of probable cause by the 
magistrate who issued the search warrant. This argument is based 
on an allegation that the affidavit did not establish the 
reliability of the informant or the basis of the informant's 
knowledge about the cultivation of marijuana at the defendants' 
houses. 
A. Standard of Review. 
The standard of reviewing the sufficiency of an 
affidavit in support of a search warrant has been explicated by 
this Court in State v. Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). This Court said; 
When a search warrant is subsequently 
challenged on the grounds that it was issued 
without the requisite probable cause, as in 
this case, "the fourth amendment does not 
require that the reviewing court conduct a de 
novo review of the magistrates' probable 
cause determination." rState v.] Babbell, 770 
P.2d [987] at 991 [(Utah 1989)]. Rather, the 
determination is "whether the magistrate had 
a substantial basis to conclude that in the 
totality of circumstances the affidavit 
adequately established probable cause for the 
issuance of a search warrant." State v. 
Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 129 (Utah 1987). 
Moreover, in making this determination, the 
reviewing court is to give the magistrate's 
decision "great deference." Id. (quoting 
Gates, 462 U.S. at 236). 
Our role in reviewing that determination is 
limited: "Because a trial court is in an 
advantageous position to assess witness 
credibility, 'we will not disturb its factual 
assessment underlying a decision to . . . 
deny a suppression motion unless it clearly 
appears that the lower court was in error.'" 
rState v.] Droneberg, 120 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 
28 [(Utah Ct. App. October 20, 1989)] 
(quoting State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 
(Utah 1987)). Clear error is indicated when 
the trial court's factual assessment is 
against the clear weight of the evidence or 
induces a firm conviction that a mistake has 
been committed. Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1258. 
Stromberq, 783 P.2d at 57. Applying this standard of review, it 
is clear that the trial court correctly denied defendants' motion 
to suppress the evidence. 
B. Probable Cause Determination. 
The probable cause standard is settled in federal and 
Utah law to mean just that—a probability, not a certainty. The 
United States Supreme Court said: 
[I]t is clear that "only the probability, and 
not a prima facie showing, of criminal 
activity is the standard of probable cause." 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983) (quoting Spinelli v. 
United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969). The appellate courts of 
this state have consistently followed the holding of the United 
States Supreme Court regarding 
the test to determine whether an affidavit 
establishes the necessary probable cause: 
The task of the issuing magistrate is 
simply to make a practical, commonsense 
decision whether, given all the 
circumstances set forth in the affidavit 
before him, including the 'veracity' and 
'basis of knowledge' of persons supplying 
hearsay information, there is a fair 
probability that contraband or evidence of 
a crime will be found in a particular 
place. And the duty of a reviewing court 
is simply to ensure that the magistrate 
had a 'substantial basis for . . . 
concluding]' that probable cause existed. 
[Gates 462 U.S.] at 238-39 (quoting Jones v. 
United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 .. . 
(1960) . 
State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363, 1365 (Utah Ct. App.), cert. 
denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 
U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983)). See also State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 
1258, 1261 (Utah 1983), and State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 
1101 (Utah 1985) (adopting the Gates "totality of the 
circumstances" standard for reviewing affidavits for search 
warrants). 
In the present case, information that controlled 
substances were present in houses belonging to defendants came to 
the police from a citizen. In Miller, this Court addressed a 
claim that an affidavit "failed to address the veracity or 
reliability of the unidentified informant neighbors." 740 P.2d 
at 1366. This Court said: 
Although no longer a required test under the 
Gates standard, the veracity or reliability 
of an informant is still a relevant 
consideration when reviewing the totality of 
the circumstances. . . . However, the 
average neighbor witness is not the type of 
informant in need of independent proof of 
reliability or veracity. Rather, "[v]eracity 
is generally assumed when the information 
comes from an 'average citizen who is in a 
position to supply information by virtue of 
having been a crime victim or witness.'" 
State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175, 180 (Utah 
1983) (quoting LaFave, Search and Seizure § 
3.3 (1978)). 
740 P.2d at 1366 (other citations omitted). In Miller, the 
officers had "corroborated virtually all of the information 
received from the neighbors through their independent 
investigation and surveillance." _Id. This corroboration was 
coupled with the assumed veracity of a citizen informant and 
validated the probable cause determination of the issuing 
magistrate in that case. See also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 
213, 237-38 (1983) ("[Anonymous] tips, particularly when 
supplemented by independent police investigation, frequently 
contribute to the solution of otherwise 'perfect crimes.'"); 
Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959) (when officer 
had personally verified the rest of the information given by the 
informant, he had probable cause to believe the unverified 
information; i.e., that defendant was carrying drugs); State v. 
Stromberq, 783 P.2d 54, 57-58 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (informant 
akin to "average neighbor witness" and veracity assumed); State 
v. Treadway, 499 P.2d 846, 848 (Utah 1972) (veracity not subject 
to strict scrutiny); Effenbeck v. State, 700 P.2d 811, 812-14 
(Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (reasoning behind lessened need for 
verification of anonymous tip from citizen informant). 
In the case now before this Court, the Metro Narcotics 
Task Force received information from a citizen, through an agency 
called Crime Solvers, that marijuana, mushrooms and paraphernalia 
for cultivating those plants would be found at 1268 and 1276 
Montgomery, Salt Lake City, Utah (Affidavit for search warrant, 
Addendum B). While the informant's name was not included in the 
affidavit, the informant had given his name to Crime Solvers so 
it was known to the officers. The informant told Crime Solvers 
that the Elkins lived at 1268 Montgomery and also owned the 
vacant adjacent property at 1276 Montgomery. The informant had 
"confronted" children who were carrying baggies of marijuana from 
the residences (Affidavit, Addendum B). 
The veracity of the informant was bolstered by the 
informant's willingness to give his name to Crime Solvers, not 
merely to remain anonymous. That the name was not given in the 
affidavit did not negate effect of the fact that he did give it. 
Thus, he was more than an anonymous informant. The affidavit 
states that the informant has a particularized interest in one of 
the children, although it does not give specific details about 
that interest (Affidavit, Addendum B).. Apparently, an effort 
was made to protect the identity of the informant at that 
juncture, while still providing sufficient information to justify 
issuance of the search warrant. 
As in the cases cited above, the officers did not 
merely rely upon the information given them by the informant. 
They corroborated the information and listed their corroboration 
2 
in the affidavit. Officer Caffery and other officers confirmed 
the information that David Elkins owned both homes; they verified 
"many small details" about the property, such as the greenhouses 
In his brief, defendant claims that the warrant was executed 
by "an unknown Affiant"; however, he then names Robert Caffery as 
the affiant (Brief of Appellant at 11). The affidavit carries 
the signature of Officer Caffery as affiant. 
attached to the rear of both homes. The officers walked on a 
canal bank behind the homes and saw what appeared to be marijuana 
plants and leaves silhouetted against a translucent panel in one 
of the greenhouses. They also smelled the "pervasive" and 
"unique smell of large quantities of green marijuana" as they 
walked past the backyards and the greenhouses (Affidavit, 
Addendum B). 
Defendants also complain that the date of the 
informant's and the officers' observations were not given in the 
affidavit. While it would have been preferable for that 
3 
information to have been included in the affidavit , it's 
omission is not fatal to the warrant. There was no allegation 
that the information was stale. The information supported an 
inference that the cultivation of marijuana was an ongoing 
activity. In Stromberq, this Court said: 
["W]here the affidavit properly recites facts 
indicating activity of a protracted and 
continuous nature, a course of conduct, the 
passage of time becomes less significant.["] 
783 P.2d at 57 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 461 F.2d 285, 
287 (10th Cir. 1972)). The information that defendants used 
their homes and attached greenhouses to grow marijuana and 
mushrooms, and that the informant had confronted children 
bringing baggies of marijuana from the houses indicate activity 
of a continuous nature. This makes the omission of the time of 
Testimony at the suppression hearing was that the phone call 
to Crime Solvers and the corroboration all occurred on the day 
the warrant was issued (Tr. at 41 and 60). 
observation and corroboration from the affidavit less 
significant. 
While the information and corroboration in this case 
may not have supported a finding of "certain knowledge" that 
contraband existed at the houses, it did support a determination 
of probable cause. State v. Tappf 26 Utah 2d 392, 490 P.2d 334, 
337 (1971). 
POINT II 
EVEN IF THIS SEARCH WARRANT WERE TO BE FOUND 
TO BE DEFECTIVE, THE EVIDENCE FOUND IN THE 
SEARCH IS STILL ADMISSIBLE UNDER UNITED 
STATES V. LEON. 
Defendants next claim that the trial court erred in 
determining that the officers acted in good faith under United 
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), when they executed the 
search warrant in this matter (E.R. at 38). This claim is based 
solely on defendants' allegation that the affidavit lacked 
probable cause for its issuance, as argued in Point I of their 
brief. While in Point III of their brief defendants allege that 
the affidavit contains false and misleading statements, they do 
not analyze the good faith exception of Leon on that basis. 
Consequently, the State will only address the probable cause 
argument in the good faith context. 
United State v. Leon first expressed a good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule for evidence seized pursuant 
to an illegal search. The deterrent effect of exclusion of the 
evidence is aimed at law enforcement agents, not magistrates. 
468 U.S. at 917-18. If a magistrate incorrectly determines that 
probable cause has been established and issues the warrant, an 
officer usually can rely on that determination; punishing an 
officer for the magistrate's error does not accomplish the 
purposes of the exclusionary rule, 468 U.S. at 921-22. However, 
the officer's reliance on the magistrate's determination must be 
"objectively reasonable[.]" 468 U.S. at 922. 
The Supreme Court listed certain circumstances in which 
the good faith exception would not apply. The circumstance upon 
which defendants rely in this case is stated as: 
Nor would an officer manifest objective good 
faith in relying on a warrant based on an 
affidavit "so lacking in indicia of probable 
cause as to render official belief in its 
existence entirely unreasonable." 
468 U.S. at 923 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11 
(1975)). 
As was noted in Point I, the information given in the 
affidavit was sufficient to establish probable cause for issuance 
of the warrant. Defendants' contention that the information 
would not have been admissible in court and thus cannot support a 
finding of probable cause is not well taken. The United States 
Supreme Court has consistently reiterated that "a finding of 
'probable cause' may rest upon evidence which is not legally 
competent in a criminal trial." United States v. Ventresca, 380 
U.S. 102, 107 (1965) (citing Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 
307, 311 (1959). 
Even if this court were to find that the information 
given in the affidavit was insufficient to establish probable 
cause, the information is not so lacking as to make the officers' 
reliance thereon unreasonable. The courts have determined that 
reliance upon "bare bones" affidavits is unreasonable and thus 
the good faith exception would not apply. In Leon/ the affidavit 
"related the results of an extensive investigation" and "provided 
evidence sufficient to create disagreement among thoughtful and 
competent judges as to the existence of probable cause." 468 
U.S. at 926. Wholly conclusory statements in affidavits in 
previous cases were found to be insufficient to establish 
probable cause. Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933); 
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). The affidavit in the 
present case is not so conclusory or bare that an objectively 
reasonable officer would have doubted that probable cause 
existed. The affidavit contained the statements of a citizen 
informant who had stated that defendants used the houses and 
greenhouses to grow controlled substances and had seen children 
leaving the houses with marijuana. The affidavit also gave 
corroborating information from the officers' own observations, 
including verification of details of the informant's statements 
and the officers' own observations of a marijuana-type plant and 
the odor of marijuana near the houses. A magistrate and a 
district court judge determined that this supported a probable 
cause finding. Even assuming arguendo that this was not enough 
to establish probable cause, it was at least sufficient to 
support the officers' good faith reliance on the warrant signed 
by a neutral and detached magistrate. 
POINT III 
THE AFFIDAVIT DID NOT CONTAIN ANY KNOWINGLY 
FALSE OR MISLEADING INFORMATION. 
Defendants' final claim is that the officers included 
false and misleading information in the affidavit and thus the 
evidence must be suppressed. The leading case in Utah on this 
issue is State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986), cert. 
denied, 480 U.S. 930 (1987). In that case, the Utah Supreme 
Court, citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), said: 
In Franks, the United States Supreme Court 
held that a defendant is entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing to challenge the validity 
of a search warrant if the defendant can 
establish that (i) an affiant in an affidavit 
supporting a search warrant made a false 
statement intentionally, knowingly, or with 
reckless disregard for the truth, and (ii) 
the affidavit is insufficient to support a 
finding of probable cause after the 
misstatement is set aside. 483 U.S. 171-72. 
By an extension of reasoning, the same test 
applies when a misstatement occurs because 
information is omitted; the affidavit must be 
evaluated to determine if it will support a 
finding of probable cause when the omitted 
information is inserted. . . . If an 
affidavit fails to support a finding of 
probable cause after the false statements are 
excised or the omitted information is added, 
i.e., if the omission or misstatement 
materially affects the finding of probable 
cause, any evidence obtained under the 
improperly issued warrant must be suppressed. 
Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 191 (citations omitted). In the affidavit 
in the present case, the officers did not include "a false 
statement intentionally, knowingly, or with reckless disregard 
for the truth." 483 U.S. at 171-72. 
The statements challenged by defendants were that: 
Large plants were evident through the 
translucent panels in the greenhouse 
including one pressed against the panel that 
had the silhouette of a marijuana leaf. The 
unique smell of large quantities of green 
marijuana was pervasive as your affiant and 
officer Caffery [Jensen?] walked past the 
backyards and the greenhouse. 
(Affidavit, Addendum B). Defendants have not established that 
these statements were false. The affidavit reads that large 
plants were apparent through the translucent panel and that one 
leaf pressed against the panel had the "silhouette of a marijuana 
leaf." Testimony at the suppression hearing established that the 
plants in the greenhouse were not marijuana. However, there was 
a vine in the greenhouse and the leaves against the panel were 
similar to marijuana leaves (Tr. at 49-50, 65-66, and 70). The 
similarity between the plants found and marijuana supports the 
trial court's determination that defendants "did not prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the affidavit contained false 
statements that were known to be false or made with reckless 
disregard of the truth." (E.R. at 37-38, Addendum A). 
At the suppression hearing, defendants challenged the 
officers' statements that they smelled marijuana from the 
backyard of the residences. However, they did not prove that 
those statements were false; neither have they analyzed that 
contention in their brief. Thus, the trial court's determination 
that no false statements regarding the odor of marijuana were 
knowingly or recklessly made has not been properly challenged on 
appeal. 
Because defendants have not carried their burden to 
prove that false statements were intentionally, knowing or 
recklessly made in the affidavit, the trial court did not err in 
admitting the evidence seized in the search- Nielsen, 727 P.2d 
at 191. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm defendants' convictions and sentences. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ,^ir" day of May, 1990. 
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THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRIC^uryc,erk 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v, 
ROBERT M. BROWN, 
DAVID E. ELKINS, and 
SUSAN L. ELKINS 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND ORDER 
Case Nos. CR 89-18, 
89-19 & 89-20 
Honorable Frank G. Noel 
The defendants filed a Motion to Suppress on February 27, 
1989, with a supporting memorandum. The State submitted an 
opposing memorandum on March 6, 1989. An evidentiary hearing was 
presented to the Court on March 8, 1989, and the parties submitted 
post-evidentiary hearing memoranda. By minute entry of April 5, 
1989, the Court denied the motion, and counsel for the parties 
were notified of this ruling as of May 12, 1989. The following 
sets forth the Court's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
order pertaining to Defendants' Motion to Suppress. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On November 4, 1988, Judge Dennis Fuchs of the 
Third Circuit Court approved and issued a search warrant to search 
the premises of 1268 and 1276 Montgomery Street in Salt Lake City, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
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2. The search warrant described the property to be 
seized as "marijuana plants, psychedelic mushrooms, paraphernalia 
used for growing, harvesting, and processing these plants," 
3. Detective Robert Caffery, who was at that time 
assigned to the Salt Lake Metro Narcotics Strike Force, submitted 
to Judge Fuchs an affidavit that Detective Caffery had signed in 
support of the search warrant. 
4. There are no knowing or reckless material false 
statements contained in Detective Caffery's affidavit in support 
of the search warrant. 
5. The search warrant was executed on November 4, 1988 
at 1268 and 1272 Montgomery Street. Marijuana was found and 
seized at both addresses as well as other relevant items. 
6. The law enforcement personnel who obtained and 
executed the warrant considered the warrant to be valid and relied 
upon it as authorizing the search conducted in this case. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The affidavit in support of the search warrant 
should be considered in its entirety because the defendants did 
not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the affidavit 
contained false statements that were known to be false or made 
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with reckless disregard of the truth. Franks v. Delaware, 438 
U.S. 154 (1978); State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986). 
2. The search warrant was supported by probable cause, 
and, accordingly, the search warrant was valid under the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 
Article I Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. Illinois v. Gates, 
462 U.S. 213 (1983); State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099 (Utah 
1985) . Therefore, the evidence seized pursuant to the search 
warrant should not be suppressed. 
3. Because the peace officers obtaining and executing 
this search warrant acted in objectively reasonable reliance on 
the warrant, the evidence also should not be suppressed because 
the good faith doctrine applies. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 
897 (1984). 
ORDER 
Based upon the points and authorities submitted by 
counsel, the evidence presented, the foregoing findings of fact 
and conclusions of law, and the Court being fully advised in the 
premises, it is hereby 
ORDERED, that the Defendants' Motion to Suppress be and 
it hereby is DENIED; and it is further 
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ORDERED, that the evidence seized pursuant to the search 
warrant at issue here shall not be suppressed. 
DATED this /t> day of May, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE FRANK G. NOI 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
SMM/SC/0066U 
ADDENDUM B 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
HOWARD R. LEMCKE 
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Fhcne: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SEARCH WARRANT 
NO. (X)\<M 
COUKTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
To any peace officer in the State of Utah, 
Froof by Affidavit under oath having been made this day before me 
bypCT. fo5tf(T C^fiF^y , I am' satisfied that there is probable 
cause to believe, ' 
That (X) on the premises known as 1268 Montgomery, one story 
brown brick residence, 1276 Montgomery, one story red 
brick residence, with a common driveway and backyard, 
the curtilage of both and a white shed behind 1268 
Montgomery, 
In the City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there 
is now certain property or evidence described as: 
Marijuana plants, psychedelic mushrooms, paraphernalia used 
for growing, harvesting, and processing these plants, 
and that said property or evidence: 
(X) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed, or 
(X) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense, or . 
(X) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a 
means of committing or concealing a public offense, or 
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal 
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct. 
You are therefore commanded: _ _^ 
(X) in the day time, until «S-5n;u"~p.m. 
to make a search of the above-named or described premises for the 
herein-above described property or evidence and if you find the same 
PJ\GE 2 
SEARCH « « * « «
 r i f t „ 
h e o £ to b r ing i t forthwith b . * o r « m . i ^ s u c h 
prope r ty in ,our
 d a v „ o ^ o v e m b e r r 1.81 cucui>- -- custody, s »
u J 6 " " , 0 oo 
property m ,our
 d av, .c^ovember r 1988. 
^ MY HAND and d a t e d t h i s _,ZL- , , £ ^ . / ; - . 
GIVEW UNDER MY hAND , » % ' ^ ^ / 
^IHOOO n 
AVID E. YOCOM 
alt Lake County Attorney 
CWARD R. LEMCKE 
•euuty Salt Lake County Attorney 
31 East 400 South 
•alt Lake City, Utah 84111 
hone: (601) 363-7900 
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, SA.LT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
?TATE OF UTAH ) 
bounty of Salt Lake ) 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
BEFORE: D*** « /~IL/J 450 South 2nd East 
JUDGE ADDRESS 
The undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That he has reason to believe 
That (X) on the premises kncwn^as 1268 Montgomery, fane story 
brown brick residence,^ 1276 Montgomeryf a one story red 
brick residence, with a common driveway and backyard, 
the curtliage of both and a white shed behind 1268 
Montgomery, 
In the City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there 
is now certain property or evidence described as: 
Marijuana plants, psychedelic mushrooms, paraphernalia used 
for growing, harvesting, and processing these plants, 
and that said property or evidence: 
(X) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed, or 
(X) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense, or 
(X) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a 
means of committing or concealing a public offense, or 
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal 
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct. 
Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is 
evidence of the crime(s> of cultivation and possession of controlled 
substances. 
FACE 2 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
The 
are 
facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant 
A phone call was made to Crime Solvers, by their informant 
6637 who identified himself to Crime Solvers. 6637 stated 
a David and Susan Elkins lived in 1268 Montgomery and owned 
the adjacent property 1276 Montgomery that was vacant. 
That they used both homes and their attached greenhouses to 
grow Marijuana and psychedelic mushrooms. 6637 stated that 
he has confronted children who have possessed baggies of 
marijuana brought from these buildings. 
Your affiant and other officers walked down a canal that 
runs behind these two properties. The two houses were seen 
to possess ""many small details 6637 described to Crime 
Solvers. Large plants were evident through the translucent 
panels in the greenhouse including one pressed against the 
panel that had the silhouette of a marijuana leaf. The 
unique smell of large quantities of green marijuana was 
pervasive as your affiant and officer Caffery walked past 
the backyards and the greenhouse. 
Your affiant considers the information received from the 
confidential informant reliable because he fully identified himself 
to Crime Solver. Ke has a particularized interest in the welfare of 
one of the children. 
Your affiant has verified the above 
confidential informant to be correct and 
following independent investigation: 
information from the 
accurate throuah the 
WHEREFORE, 
seizure of 
Ey confirming through public utilities that David Elkins 
owns both homes. Ey walking by and confirming much detail 
of 6637' s account^^C^ T^ /*T £«OsM«Msesj*JfcCt w^ OrtrO-rp Tr^ortOf- ^Tri Pr^ eS, 
affiant pravs that a Search Warrant be issued for the the 
said items: 
(X) in the day time, until' 
J-: 
p .m. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO EEFORE ME this $Sf£z'y(hjL]jl6^e^er, 1988 
^ - • i : > -
..<• v 
JV'DGt IVT^  TgZp^-SZbVX^ClRCU1T COURT, 
